

## EXHIBIT NO. 35

JANUARY 31, 1942.

[1] Memorandum for the Record:  
 Subject: Warnings sent to Hawaii prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

Before leaving the Military Intelligence Division I am preparing this memorandum for record should it ever be needed. It covers the information now on hand concerning M. I. D.'s part in the warnings sent to Hawaii before December 7.

1. *Nov. 27, 1941.* Secret telegram from W. P. D. to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command. This telegram was numbered 472 and was sent out at 6:11 p. m. on the 27th. It stated that Japanese future action was unpredictable and that hostile action was possible at any moment. It directed the Commanding Generals to undertake, prior to hostile Japanese action, such reconnaissance and other measures as they deemed necessary, and to report measures taken. The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy.

2. *Nov. 27, 1941.* I sent a short telegram to the G-2's Hawaii and Panama and to all the Corps Areas. The telegram to Hawaii was numbered 473 and sent at 6:59 p. m. This message stated that hostilities may ensue as a result of a practical stalemate in Japanese negotiations and that subversive activities may be expected. It was sent because of the obvious seriousness of the situation and the great danger of sabotage everywhere, a point which was not specifically covered in W. P. D.'s telegram referred to in the paragraph above, and with which this Division is specifically charged under the President's directive of June 1939. This telegram was sent after consultation with W. P. D., and my recollection is that they recommended the inclusion of the direction that the G-2's would inform the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staffs only.

3. *Nov. 27, 1941.* The Commanding General, Hawaii, replied in a short telegram to the W. P. D. telegram referred to in Par. 1 above. This telegram was numbered 959 and received in Washington at 5:57 a. m., Nov. 28. It specifically refers to the number of the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, and therefore is an answer [2] to that telegram. It states, however, that his Department was alerted "to prevent sabotage." It further stated that he had liaison with Navy. Being an answer to the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, this reply from General Short was sent to and seen by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and W. P. D. It was not sent to or seen by this Division. I do not remember to have been informed of this message in any way.

4. *Nov. 28, 1941.* At some time during this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes. He stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one of the western depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all air forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's. He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the air commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have disastrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the W. P. D. warning message of November 27. My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a staff conference in General Bryden's office attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe, General Gullion. The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified,

however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimitation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy and the F. B. I. This message as approved in the staff conference was sent by The Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all Corps Areas and overseas departments. The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8:37 p. m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned staff conference, at the insistence of the Air Corps, that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all air commands, and this was done. The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484 and sent at 9:23 p. m.

[3] 5. *November 29, 1941.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied by reference to the Adjutant General's cable #482 of November 28 (the message referred to in the paragraph immediately above as having been sent by The Adjutant General as a result of the staff conference in General Bryden's office). This message stated in detail the precautions which General Short had put into effect in Hawaii against subversive activity. It was sent by The Adjutant General on December 1, 1941 to the Secretary of the General Staff, and by the latter disseminated to the Staff, including of course M. I. D. It was considered by this Division as a satisfactory answer to the message which it purported to answer, i. e. the message of November 28 which resulted from the Bryden staff conference on subversive activity.

6. *On the morning of December 7, 1941,* having received certain information that morning that the Japanese negotiations would definitely be broken off at 2 p. m. that afternoon, and being convinced that this might well be timed with a planned Japanese attack somewhere, I went to the Chief of Staff's office and urged him to send a warning message to the overseas departments. While I was there General Gerow, Col. Bratton of this Division, and Col. Bundy of W. P. D., came in. They fully concurred in the necessity for such a message. It was written by the Chief of Staff, sent by the hand of Col. Bratton to the Message Center, and the Message Center stated it would be in the hands of the recipients within another half hour. Col. Bratton so reported to the Chief of Staff. It was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack began.

7. *Summary.* There are obviously three points of outstanding interest in regard to these messages:

a. General Short's message, number 959, of November 27, specifically stated that it was an answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 of the same date. It was a wholly inadequate answer to that message. It was not, however, referred in any way to this Division, nor was its contents made known to this Division. Even had it been made known to this Division, the responsibility of determining whether or not it was an adequate answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 clearly lay with the latter Division.

b. The repetition of sabotage warnings contained in the M. I. D. message number 473 of November 27 and in T. A. G. message number 482 of November 28. The latter message resulted in the insistence of the Air Corps that further sabotage warning be sent, and I fully concurred in the sending of such warning provided they were sent to the responsible Commanding Generals as well as to the air commands, and that they continued precautions against unlimited action on the part of many relatively junior air commanders.

[4] c. The failure of the Signal Corps to get the message of December 7 through promptly or to notify the Chief of Staff or any Division of the Staff that it would not go through promptly.

[s] Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:

Memo from Lt. Col. C. J. Barrett, January 29, 1942 on the background on the Air Corps message of Nov. 28, 1941.

JANUARY 29, 1942.

Memorandum for General Miles:

Subject: Interview with Major Blake.

The following information was obtained from Major Charles R. Blake, Chief, of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps:

On the morning of November 28, Major Blake was called to General Scanlon's office and directed to prepare a message addressed to the commanders of all Air

Force activities, both in the United States and foreign possessions, directing them to take the necessary steps to prevent sabotage, espionage and the execution of any other threat to internal security. Major Blake wrote in longhand in that office a draft copy of which is attached, marked "Enclosure 1". Later he wrote a clearer copy of the same draft, still in longhand, copy of which is attached marked "Enclosure 2". The message was then typed with several carbon copies and delivered by Major Blake to General Scanlon, standing in the door to General Arnold's office. Another officer, believed to be Colonel Vanaman, was present, but since Major Blake does not know Colonel Vanaman, identity is not certain. General Scanlon took the message to General Arnold's office\* and left a short time later with the statement that the message was to be coordinated with G-2.

No reason for the preparation of this message was given to Major Blake at the time. He states, however, that he was later informed unofficially that it resulted from a conference attended by the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army Air Forces and the Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ C. J. Barrett  
C. J. BARRETT,  
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosures:

Cpy. radio 11-28-41  
Cpy. radio 11-28-41

Encl #1

11/28/41 12:02 P. M.  
CRB

Secret

A. C. of AS-A2  
Auth: ~~Ch of A. G.~~  
Date: 11-28-41  
Initials: CRB  
Copy No. 2 of 6

The world situation requires immediate atten. to the problem of sabotage, subversion and espionage prevention in all echelons of the AAF.

You are directed to initiate forthwith all addit. measures nec to provide for the comple prot of your establish and equip against sab, prot of your pers against subv prop and prot of all activities against esp.

It is further directed that reports of all steps init by you to comply with these instr be sub to CAAF on or before 12/2/41.

Encl. #2

Secret

Auth: ~~Ch. of A. G.~~  
AC of AS-A-2

Date: 11-28-41  
Initials: /S/ CRB  
Copy No. 2 of 6

To: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.  
Chief of the Air Corps.

Commanding Generals of all Foreign Air Force Activities.

1. The world situation requires immediate attention to the problem of sabotage, subversion, and espionage prevention in all echelons of the Army Air Forces.

2. You are directed to initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the complete protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage.

3. It is further directed that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions be submitted to the CAAF on or before Dec. 2, 1941.